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BEFORE THE ARIZONA NAVIGABLE STREAM ADJUDICATION COMMISSION

In re Determination of Navigability of the San Pedro River

No. 03-004-NAV

SALT RIVER PROJECT'S RESPONSIVE POST-HEARING MEMORANDUM

The Salt River Project Agricultural Improvement and Power District and Salt River Valley Water Users' Association (collectively, "SRP") submit their responsive post-hearing memorandum on the navigability of the San Pedro River ("San Pedro") in its ordinary and natural condition as of February 14, 1912. For the reasons set forth herein and in SRP's opening memorandum, SRP requests that the Commission find the San Pedro non-navigable.

The only opening memorandum filed by a party contending that the San Pedro is navigable was submitted by the Defenders of Wildlife, et al. ("DOW").² SRP herein responds to the DOW memorandum. Virtually all of the evidence cited and arguments made in the DOW memorandum already were discussed at length in SRP's opening memorandum. SRP

¹ See Salt River Project's Opening Post-Hearing Memorandum (September 13, 2013) ("SRP Opening").

² See Memorandum Regarding Navigability of San Pedro River (September 13, 2013) ("DOW Opening").

thus has addressed only a few additional points in this responsive memorandum. The short answer to the underlying question is that DOW (the lone proponent of navigability) simply has not presented sufficient evidence to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the San Pedro was "navigable" in its ordinary and natural condition when Arizona became a state on February 14, 1912.

I. The San Pedro was in Its Ordinary and Natural Condition from the 1840s until the 1870s.

Numerous individuals who were present along the San Pedro in the mid-1800s observed a small and insignificant river. FF#24-47.³ In an attempt to overcome those facts, DOW contends that the river had been affected by human activity by that time and, thus, was not in its "ordinary and natural condition." *See* DOW Opening, at 13-15. DOW refers extensively to the Arizona Court of Appeals opinion in *State v. ANSAC*, 224 Ariz. 230, 229 P.3d 242 (App. 2010), but then ignores the most pertinent portions of that opinion for purposes of the question at hand.

As DOW correctly recites, the court in *State v. ANSAC* found that the Commission must examine watercourses in their "ordinary (i.e., usual, absent major flooding or drought) and natural (i.e., without man-made dams, canals, or other diversions) condition." *See* DOW Opening, at 13 (quoting *State v. ANSAC*, 224 Ariz. at 241, 229 P.3d at 253). What DOW then ignores, however, is that, in applying that standard to the Lower Salt, the appellate court first started with the time "before the Hohokam people arrived many centuries ago and developed canals and other diversions that actively diverted the River." *State v. ANSAC*, 224 Ariz. at 242, 229 P.3d at 254. Recognizing that "little if any historical data exists from that period"

³ As it did in its opening memorandum, SRP refers herein to its September 13, 2103 proposed findings of fact as "FF#__" and its proposed conclusions of law as "CL#__." For purposes of attempting to provide the Commission with a single consolidated set of findings and conclusions, Freeport-McMoRan Corporation and SRP are submitting a supplemented and revised joint set of findings and conclusions concurrently with their responsive memoranda. Except as otherwise noted, citations herein are to SRP's September 13 proposed findings and conclusions, for consistency with SRP's opening memorandum.

and that the Lower Salt "largely returned to its natural state" after the Hohokam disappeared, the court found that "the [Lower Salt] River could be considered to be in its natural condition after many of the Hohokam's diversions had ceased to affect the River, but before the commencement of modern-era settlement and farming in the Salt River Valley. . . ." *Id*.

The evidence shows that a similar situation took place on the San Pedro. As with the Hohokam on the Lower Salt, some amount of human activity occurred on the San Pedro in early times. *Compare State v. ANSAC*, 224 Ariz. at 242, 229 P.3d at 254, *with* FF#20-23. The Hohokam inhabited the Lower Salt "many centuries ago," and the Sobaipuri Indians and Spaniards inhabited the San Pedro from the 1500s until the early 1800s. *Compare State v. ANSAC*, 224 Ariz. at 242, 229 P.3d at 254, *with* FF#21-23. The Hohokam vanished from the Salt River Valley, and the Sobaipuri and Spaniards largely abandoned the San Pedro in the early 1800s. *Compare State v. ANSAC*, 224 Ariz. at 242, 229 P.3d at 254, *with* Tr. at 8/1/13:134-36, 174-79. Significant irrigation did not begin again in the San Pedro until the 1870s. *See* FF#124.⁴

Thus, for the San Pedro, the period from the 1840s until the 1870s is analogous to the period of time for the Lower Salt that the *State v. ANSAC* court characterized as "after many of the Hohokam's diversions had ceased to affect the River, but before the commencement of modern-era settlement and farming in the Salt River Valley." 224 Ariz. at 242, 229 P.3d at 254. Consistent with the court's holding in *State v. ANSAC*, that is a time when San Pedro should be considered to have been in its ordinary and natural condition. *Id.* It is fortuitous that significant direct historical evidence exists from that period in the form of recorded observations by explorers, military personnel, and others who traveled through the San Pedro area. *See* FF#24-47.

⁴ The irrigation that began in the 1870s was primarily around the town of St. David. For purposes of the current analysis, the area upstream of St. David remains largely in its ordinary and natural condition to the present day. See FF#123.

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⁵ See Salt River Project and Freeport-McMoRan Corporation's Proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, Findings of Fact Nos. 122-124 (September 27, 2013).

Because substantial evidence exists for the period from the 1840s until the 1870s when the San Pedro was clearly in its "ordinary and natural condition," the question of whether the San Pedro was in its "ordinary and natural" condition from the 1500s until the early 1800s is not particularly relevant. No stream flow records exist from that 1500s-early 1800s period, and what historical evidence that does exist from that period is sparse. See FF#21-23. The only way to address the 1500s-early 1800s period for which there is no documented evidence might be to engage in theoretical gyrations of the type Mr. Hjalmarson attempted. See Section II, infra. Those efforts were unnecessary and methodologically flawed, however. Id.; see also SRP Opening, at 10-13; FF#105-112. This Commission need not grapple with the speculative question of what the river looked like from the 1500s to the early 1800s, when the few people who were there at the time to see it did not record their observations. The entire San Pedro was in its "ordinary and natural condition" from the 1840s until the 1870s, and the Commission should place the most significant weight on evidence from that period. That evidence shows that the San Pedro was not and is not navigable.

II. Mr. Hjalmarson's Hypothetical Analysis is Unnecessary because Historical Evidence Exists from a Time when the River was in its "Ordinary and Natural Condition."

DOW opening, at 10-12. By DOW's own admission, Mr. Hjalmarson's work involved taking data regarding the San Pedro and "extrapolat[ing] from that data to determine the flow of the river in its natural condition." *Id.* at 11 (emphasis added). For example, Mr. Hjalmarson used water flow data to determine the shape of the river bed. *Id.* After using the flow data to determine the shape, he applied the same flow data to that shape to determine the depth of water. *Id.* at 12. Mr. Hjalmarson himself acknowledged that "fine precision is

unlikely" in his work and that it involved, among other things, estimation and extrapolation from other data. See FF#106.

The parties perhaps could engage in an academic discussion to determine the technical feasibility of Mr. Hjalmarson's approach, and a portion of the hearing in this matter certainly involved such a discussion. See FF#105-112. The important point is, however, that Mr. Hjalmarson's hypothetical work was unnecessary because first-hand historical observations of the San Pedro's flows and depths are available from a time when the river was in its ordinary and natural condition. No need exists to "extrapolate" or hypothesize in order to make an estimation of natural factors that were readily observed and recorded by credible individuals.

As set forth in SRP's opening memorandum and in its proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law, ample evidence exists of historical observations of the San Pedro from the mid-1800s. See SRP Opening, at 2-5; FF##24-47. The entire San Pedro was in its "ordinary and natural condition" at that time. See Section I, supra. Neither Mr. Hjalmarson's testimony nor DOW's legal arguments based upon that testimony are sufficient to overcome what those contemporaneous individuals observed on the river in the mid-1800s. DOW has not met its burden of proof. See CL#30-33.

III. Sporadic Modern-Day Recreational Boating Does Not Prove that the San Pedro was Susceptible to Navigation in its Ordinary and Natural Condition in 1912.

DOW largely concedes (as it must) that no commercial navigation has ever occurred on the San Pedro, stating that "[e]vidence of historic navigation of the San Pedro is limited to the possible use of a canoe by James O. Pattie." *See* DOW Opening, at 10. No evidence exists that such "possible" use of a canoe, even if it did occur during one of Pattie's trips, was on the San Pedro and not on one of the several other rivers on which his party traveled. *See* FF#25.

Faced with those facts, DOW tries to latch on to a modern survey showing that, "at one time or another" between 1973 and 1992, recreational users boated the San Pedro. See DOW Opening, at 10; see also FF#81. DOW notes that the report by the Arizona State Land

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26 27 Department's consultant observed that "modern use of a river reach by canoes probably indicates that canoes could have been used at the time of statehood." See DOW Opening, at 10. DOW neglects to mention, however, that the same consultant also characterized the modern-day trips discussed in the survey as "very opportunistic," such that "boaters drive to a launching point on likely rain days and 'put in' the water if rain conditions favor runoff." See FF#81.

The limited evidence of recreational boating on the San Pedro does not satisfy the standard set forth by the United States Supreme Court in PPL Montana, LLC v. Montana, 132 S. Ct. 1215 (2012). In that case, the Court stated that evidence of navigation must be sufficient to comport with "commercial reality." Id. at 1234. In its decision that the United States Supreme Court overturned, the Montana Supreme Court relied heavily upon modernday recreational boating on the rivers. See PPL Montana, LLC v. State, 355 Mont. 402, 229 P.3d 421, 431-36 (2010), rev'd, 132 S. Ct. at 1215. In rejecting the Montana Supreme Court's analysis, the United States Supreme Court confirmed its prior pronouncements that the test for navigability relates to use or susceptibility to use for commerce as of the date of statehood. 132 S. Ct. at 1221. "Navigability must be assessed as of the time of statehood, and it concerns the river's usefulness for 'trade and travel,' rather than for other purposes." Id. "Mere use by initial explorers or trappers who may have dragged their boats in or alongside the river despite its nonnavigability in order to avoid getting lost, or to provide water for their horses or themselves, is not enough." Id.

Furthermore, the United States Supreme Court in PPL Montana made clear that evidence of modern-day recreational uses is not persuasive unless "the watercraft are meaningfully similar to those in customary use for trade and travel at the time of statehood." 132 S. Ct. at 1233. Although DOW submitted documents to show the types of boats that might have been available through mail-order in 1912, see FF#128-130, DOW presented no testimony or other evidence that those were the same types of watercraft that were used by recreational boaters in the 1970s, 1980s, or 1990s. In fact, it is unlikely that any modern-day

boaters were using canoes made of oak, spruce, cedar, or cypress, such as those described in the 1912 Sears & Roebuck catalog submitted by DOW. See FF#128.

IV. The San Pedro Is Not and Never Was Navigable.

Aside from one citation regarding "segmentation" in its Section II(B), DOW's opening memorandum contains no reference to the United States Supreme Court's 2012 opinion in *PPL Montana*, that Court's most recent pronouncement on navigability-for-title issues. *See generally* DOW Opening. That lack of citation is perhaps not surprising, because the Supreme Court's opinion is the death knell for any argument DOW ever might have had that the San Pedro was navigable. In addition to requiring that evidence of modern-day boating must be linked to the type of boats used at statehood in order for that evidence to be persuasive, *see* Section III, *supra*, the Court also:

- 1. Reaffirmed that the test is applied as of the date of statehood, *see* PPL Montana, 132 S. Ct. at 1227-28 ("Upon statehood, the State gains title within its borders to the beds of watercourses then navigable. . . .");
- 2. Reiterated that the specific requirements of the test for navigability depend upon the context in which the question is posed and that admiralty and Commerce Clause cases are not particularly persuasive on navigability-for-title issues, *id.* at 1228 ("the test for navigability is not applied in the same way in these distinct types of cases. . . . For state title purposes under the equal-footing doctrine, navigability is determined at the time of statehood . . . and based on the 'natural and ordinary condition' of the water");
- 3. Stated that the basis for a determination of navigability is use or susceptibility for use of the watercourse as highway for commerce, *id.* at 1230 ("By contrast, segments that are nonnavigable at the time of statehood are those over which commerce could not then occur. Thus, there is no reason that these segments also should be deemed owned by the State under the equal-footing doctrine."); and
- 4. Confirmed its prior pronouncements that the test relates to use or susceptibility to use for commerce and not for some other purpose, *id.* at 1233 ("Navigability must be

assessed as of the time of statehood, and it concerns the river's usefulness for 'trade and travel,' rather than for other purposes.").

If and to the extent that DOW had any plausible argument before 2012 that the San Pedro was navigable, that argument is now gone. Under the test clearly set forth in *PPL Montana*, the San Pedro is not navigable. Any contention that river is or ever was susceptible to navigation is a result of fantasy or wishful thinking, not "commercial reality." 132 S. Ct. at 1234. The Commission should find the San Pedro non-navigable.

DATED this 27th day of September, 2013.

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